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Abstract
We provide a methodology to study the role of market distortions
on the emergence of indeterminacy and bifurcations. Most of the
specic market imperfections considered in the related literature are
particular cases of our framework. Comparing them we obtain several
equivalence results in terms of local dynamic properties, highlighting
the main chanels and classes of distortions responsible for indetermi-
nacy. Our methodolgy consists in introducing general specications
for the elasticities of the crucial functions dening the aggregate equi-
librium dynamics of the model. This allows us to study how market
distortions inuence the range of values for the elasticity of inputs
substitution under which local indeterminacy and bifurcations occur.
Applying this methodology to the Woodford (1986) framework we nd
that distortions in the capital market, per se, do not play a major role.
We further show that, for empirically plausible values of elasticity of
substitution between inputs, indeterminacy requires a minimal degree
of distortions. This degree seems to be high under output market
distortions, while with labor market distortions the required degree is
empirically plausible.
JEL classication: C62, E32.
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1 Introduction
Several papers have studied the e¤ects of specic market distortions (linked to
externalities, imperfectly competitive markets, or government intervention)
on local dynamics.1 However, a systematic analysis within a general unied
framework, able to compare the importance of di¤erent distortions for the
emergence of indeterminacy and bifurcations, is still missing. In order to ll
this gap, we develop a methodology to study and fully characterize the role of
market distortions on the occurrence of local indeterminacy and bifurcations,
introducing a general framework that accounts for market distortions without
determining a priori their specic source.
Market distortions play a role on the local stability properties of the
steady state because they modify the elasticities of the crucial functions
characterizing the general equilibrium dynamic equations of the model. So
our approach consists in generalizing the elasticities obtained when there are
no externalities, no government and markets are perfectly competitive, intro-
ducing new parameters that represent distortions. We then study how our
distortion parameters inuence the values of the elasticities of inputs substi-
tution in production (and of labor supply) under which indeterminacy and
bifurcations occur. Most of the usual specic market distortions, and di¤er-
ent combinations among them, can be recovered as particular specications
of our distortion parameters and, thereby, our results can be used to have an
immediate idea of their potential role on the emergence of indeterminacy.
Even if our approach can be applied to any dynamic general equilibrium
model, we consider here a dynamic framework based on the Woodford (1986)
perfectly competitive one sector model segmented asset economy with het-
erogenous agents (capitalists and workers).2 In accordance with empirical
evidence, we assume that inputs are not weak substitutes, a case where in-
determinacy and bifurcations would not occur in the absence of distortions,
as shown in Grandmont et al. (1998). In contrast, with distortions, local
indeterminacy and bifurcations (Hopf, transcritical and ip) may occur in
the presence of su¢ ciently high capital-labor substitution. Our approach
allow us to highlight the main channels through which local indeterminacy
and bifurcations emerge. One of the main results is that distortions a¤ecting
the real interest rate do not play a major role on local dynamics, while with
1See the references in Section 4.
2This model was introduced by Woodford (1986) and later developed by Grandmont
et al. (1998) to account for substitution between inputs. This is a suitable framework for
our purpose, since several papers have introduced specic market distortions on product
and factor markets in this model. These papers provide examples to apply our general
methodology (see Section 4).
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distortions modifying the real wage and/or consumption and labor supply
decisions, indeterminacy may occur even when they are arbitrarily small.
However, in this case, indeterminacy requires arbitrarily large elasticities of
inputs substitution (and of labor supply). Hence, indeterminacy can only
prevail for values of the elasticity of capital-labor substitution around one
(those considered empirically plausible) under a minimal degree of distor-
tions.
To illustrate these results we consider examples of specic distortions, on
output, capital and labor markets, that can be represented as particular cases
of our framework. Our major ndings are that: (i) indeterminacy does not
occur with capital market distortions (such as capital income taxation); (ii)
indeterminacy requires implausible high output market distortions (such as
positive productive externalities or countercyclical market power); and (iii)
on the contrary, under labor market distortions (such as unemployment ben-
ets with e¢ ciency wages or unions) indeterminacy and bifurcations occur
for empirically relevant values of the parameters. Since, as shown in Grand-
mont et al. (1998), indeterminacy and bifurcations are linked to emergence
of endogenous uctuations, driven by volatile self-fullling expectations, our
results suggest that labor market imperfections are the most probable cause
of endogenous cycles. Hence, our paper fully answers the research question
raised in Grandmont et al. (1998) on whether "features such as increas-
ing returns to scale, imperfect competition, and/or sluggish adjustment of
wages or prices, alter the dynamics and may or may not improve the range
of parameters that give rise to endogenous uctuations".
We also show that several di¤erent specic market distortions have equiv-
alent representations in terms of our distortions parameters, and therefore
inuence local dynamics in the same way, sharing the same indeterminacy
mechanisms. Moreover, some specic market distortions correspond to sym-
metric representations of particular forms of taxation and, therefore, their
e¤ects on indeterminacy can be eliminated by using an appropriate scal pol-
icy rule. This result is particularly relevant from a policy point of view, since
indeterminacy leads to economic instabilility associated with the emergence
of expectations driven cycles.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present our
general framework. We study the role of our distortion parameters on local
dynamics in Section 3, and apply our results to examples with specic market
distortions in Section 4. Section 5 provides concluding remarks. Proofs and
technical details are provided in the Appendix.
2
2 The Model
The dynamic model here considered is based on the perfectly competitive
Woodford (1986)/Grandmont et al. (1998) framework. In order to ease the
presentation we begin with a brief exposition of this model.
2.1 The Perfectly Competitive Economy
In each period t = 1; 2; :::;1, output is produced under a representative
technology AF (Kt 1; Lt), where A > 0 is a scaling parameter, F (K;L) is a
strictly increasing concave function, homogeneous of degree one in capital,
K > 0, and labor, L > 0. From prot maximization, the real interest rate
t and the real wage !t are respectively equal to the marginal productivities
of capital and labor, i.e. t = AFK(Kt 1; Lt)  A(Kt 1=Lt) and !t =
AFL(Kt 1; Lt)  A!(Kt 1=Lt).
There are two types of innitely-lived consumers, workers and capital-
ists. Both can save through two assets, productive capital and money, the
latter given by a xed amount M at the economy level, constant over time.
Capitalists are less impatient than workers and do not supply labor, whereas
workers face a nance constraint which prevents them from borrowing against
their wage earnings. Focusing on equilibria where the nance constraint is
binding and capital is the asset with the greatest return, it follows that only
workers hold money (they save all their wage income in money), and cap-
italists hold the entire stock of capital. The behavior of the representative
worker can be summarized by the maximization of U
 
Cwt+1=B
 V (Lt) sub-
ject to the budget constraint Pt+1Ct+1 = wtLt =Mt, where Pt is the price of
the nal good and wt the nominal wage at period t, Cwt+1  0 the workers
consumption at period t + 1, B > 0 a scaling parameter, V (L) the desutil-
ity of labor in L 2 [0; L], where L is the workers time endowment, and
U(Cw=B) the utility of consumption. The solution of this problem is given
by the intertemporal trade-o¤ between future consumption and leisure:
!t+1Lt+1=B = t (1)
where t  (Lt) is the usual o¤er curve with " (L)  0(L)L=(L)  1;3
and Cwt+1 = !t+1Lt+1 at the monetary equilibrium, where wtLt =M in every
period t.
3It is assumed that V (L) is a continuous function for [0; L], and Cr, with r high
enough, V 0 > 0; V 00  0 for (0; L) and limL!LV 0(L) = +1, with L possibly innite.
Also, U
 
Cwt+1=B

is a continuous function of Cwt+1  0, and Cr, with r high enough,
U 0 > 0; U 00  0 for Cwt+1 > 0 , and  xU 00(x)=U 0(x) < 1: All this implies that " (L)  1.
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The representative capitalist maximizes the log-linear lifetime utility func-
tion
P1
t=1 
t lnCct subject to the budget constraint C
c
t + Kt = (1    +
rt=Pt)Kt 1; where Cct represents his consumption at period t,  2 (0; 1) his
subjective discount factor, rt the nominal interest rate and  2 (0; 1) the
depreciation rate of capital. Solving the capitalists problem we obtain the
capital accumulation equation
Kt =  [1   + t]Kt 1 (2)
A perfectly competitive intertemporal equilibrium is a sequence (Kt 1; Lt)
2 R2++, t = 1; 2; :::;1, that, for a given K0 > 0, satises (1) and (2), with
t  (Lt), !t  A!(Kt 1=Lt) and t  A(Kt 1=Lt).
Denoting by "X;j the elasticity of the function X with respect to j = K;L
evaluated at the steady state, the elasticities of the real wage, the real interest
rate and the o¤er curve, with respect to capital and labor, are given by
";K =  1  s

; ";L =
1  s

"!;K =
s

; "!;L =   s

";K = 0 ; ";L = ",
(3)
where "   1 > 0 represents the inverse of the elasticity of (private) labor
supply of the representative worker and, for the representative rm, s 2 (0; 1)
is the elasticity of output with respect to (private) capital and  > 0 is the
elasticity of (private) capital-labor substitution, all evaluated at the steady
state.4
2.2 The General Framework
We now present our general framework with market distortions, explaining
and motivating the main di¤erences with respect to the perfectly competitive
case. First, in many models characterized by market imperfections, the real
interest rate and/or the real wage relevant to the consumersdecisions are no
longer equal to the perfectly competitive marginal productivities of capital
and labor. This will happen for example in the cases of productive exter-
nalities, imperfect competition in the product market or with consumption,
labor or capital taxation. Second, with some market imperfections, like in
4Note that F (Kt 1; Lt) can be writen as Ltf(Kt 1=Lt) so that s 
f
0
(K=L)K=L=f(K=L) and 1    f(K=L)f
00(K=L)K=L
f 0 (K=L)[f(K=L) f 0 (K=L)K=L] . See Grandmont et al.
(1998) for more details.
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the case of consumption or government spending externalities on preferences,
the relevant intertemporal choice of workers becomes a choice between fu-
ture e¤ective consumption5 (that no longer coincides with the wage bill) and
leisure. Third, with leisure externalities or in the presence of labour market
imperfections, such as unemployment benets and e¢ ciency wages or unions,
the private o¤er curve derived for the perfectly competitive economy is no
longer valid at the social level (see the examples provided in Section 4).
To take these considerations into account, we propose a more general
equilibrium dynamic system, given by (4)-(5) in Denition 1 below. Our
approach consists in replacing, in the reduced equilibrium dynamic system
(1)-(2), the real interest rate t, the real wage !t, and the o¤er curve t by
three more general functions: %t, representing the real interest rate relevant
to capitalists decisions, 
t representing e¤ective consumption per unit of
labor and  t representing a generalized o¤er curve. Since we focus on local
dynamics, the elasticities of these three functions play a key role to under-
stand how market distortions a¤ect indeterminacy. We assume that they are
dened by expressions which are more general than those obtained under
perfect competition (see (3)), introducing a set of new parameters (ij, ij,
with i = f%;
; g and j = fK;Lg) that represent a large class of specic
market distortions.
Denition 1 A perfect foresight intertemporal equilibrium of our economy,
which encompasses market distortions, is a sequence (Kt 1; Lt) 2 R2++, t =
1; 2; :::;1, that for a given K0 > 0 satises:
Kt =  [1   + %t]Kt 1 (4)
(1=B)
t+1Lt+1 =  t (5)
where %t  A%(Kt 1; Lt), 
t  A
(Kt 1; Lt) and  t   (Kt 1; Lt). The
functions %(K;L); 
(K;L) and  (K;L) are positively valued and di¤eren-
tiable as many times as needed for (K;L) 2 R2++, such that
"%;K = KK +
KK

  1  s

; "%;L = KL +
KL

+
1  s

"
;K = LK +
LK

+
s

; "
;L = LL +
LL

  s

" ;K =  K +
 K

; " L =  L +
 L

+ ";
(6)
5By e¤ective consumption we mean the argument of the utility for consumption, which
in the presence of consumption or public spending externalities on preferences will also
include them.
5
where i;j 2 R and i;j 2 R, for i = K, L,   and j = K;L, are parameters
independent of " and .
As under perfect competition, the dynamics of the economy with market
distortions are governed by a two dimensional system in capital and labor,
where the rst equation represents capital accumulation and the second one
the intertemporal choice of workers. The perfectly competitive case is recov-
ered from Denition 1 for %(K;L) = AFK(K;L), 
(K;L) = AFL(K;L) and
 (K;L) =  (L), and the perfectly competitive elasticities are also recovered
from (6) with ij = ij = 0 for all i and j (see (3)). Hence, in each equality
of (6), the term ij+ij= 6= 0 represents market distortions, which add two
new components to the di¤erent elasticities: ij which provides a measure
of the importance of market distortions when inputs are high substitutes in
production ( high), and ij, which become more relevant when inputs are
weak substitutes in production ( low).
3 Local Stability Properties
3.1 Non Weak Substitutability of Inputs ( high)
Grandmont et al (1998), assuming that (1  s)  < s < 1=2 where   1  
(1 ) 2 (0; 1), have shown that local indeterminacy and bifurcations cannot
occur under perfect competition if inputs are not weak substitutes, namely
if  > s. Later on, several works that introduced specic distortions in this
framework have shown that, with distortions, indeterminacy may occur with
su¢ ciently substitutable inputs if the private elasticity of labor supply is high
enough.6 In this paper, considering that inputs are not weak substitutes, we
generalize and systematize these previous results, characterizing the e¤ects
of market imperfections on the range of values for  and " under which local
indeterminacy and bifurcations occur, highlighting several important aspects
not yet emphasized or obtained in the related literature.
The assumption that inputs are not weak substitutes is plausible. Em-
pirical studies show that the wage bill is increasing in labor, which, in the
absence of market distortions, implies that  > s and means that consump-
tion is increasing in labor. We extend this assumption to our economy with
distortions, assuming that e¤ective consumption (
L) is increasing in labor,
i.e. 1 + 
;L > 0. From (6), this implies that LL >  1 and  > s LL1+LL .
Also, since calibrated values for the capital share of output (which, in the
6See, for instance, Cazzavillan et al. (1998), Barinci and Chéron (2001), Lloyd-Braga
and Modesto (2007), and other examples provided in Section 4.
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absence of distortions, is represented by s) are usually lower than 1=2, and
since values for  are rather small when the period is short, we assume that
1=2 > s > (1 s), as typically done in Woodford economies. Finally, we fur-
ther extend the latter assumption to our economy with distortions assuming
that LL  [(s  LL)KK + KK   LL (1  s  KK)] < s  (1  s) andi;j < s. Both, given the other assumptions, are satised in the absence of
distortions, or when they are small enough.7 Moreover, these inequalities im-
ply that KK >  1 and  > s LL1+LL >
(1 s KK)
1+KK
, i.e. 1+ %;K > 0 (see (6)).
Hence, under our assumptions, capital income is increasing with capital, as
suggested by empirical works. All these assumptions are summarized below
in Assumption 1 and we consider them satised in the rest of the paper.
Assumption 1
1. Small distortions, short period and capital share of output small
a.
i;j < s, with i = K;L; , j = K;L
b. 0 < (1  s) < s < 1=2
LL  [(s  LL)KK + KK   LL (1  s  KK)] < s  (1  s)
2. E¤ective consumption increasing in L:  2

s LL
1+LL
;+1

; LL >  1.
Without distortions, Assumption 1 becomes  > s > (1  s)  with
s < 1=2, and indeterminacy cannot occur, as referred above. Hence, the
occurrence of indeterminacy and bifurcations in our framework is due to the
existence of market distortions, mainly because of their e¤ects through ij,
which are more relevant than those through i;j, when inputs are not weak
substitutes in production.
3.2 Log-linearized System
In order to obtain a full characterization of the local stability properties of
the model, we rst log-linearize the system (4)-(5) around the normalized
steady state8, obtaining:" bKtbLt+1
#
=
"
(1 + "%;K) "%;L
 ;K "
;K(1+"%;K)
1+"
;L
" ;L "%;L"
;K
1+"
;L
#" bKt 1bLt
#
 [J ]
" bKt 1bLt
#
;
(7)
7Notice that the former can also be written as
 [(1 + LL) (1  s  KK)  (s  LL)KK ] < s   LL, so that, given LL < s, it
will be satised when  is small enough.
8We consider the normalized steady state (K;L) = (1; 1), whose existence is shown in
Proposition 9 (see Appendix 6.1).
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where hat-variables denote deviation rates from their steady-state.
The local stability properties of the model, being determined by the eigen-
values of the Jacobian matrix J (or, equivalently, by its trace, T; and deter-
minant, D, as explained below) depend on the values taken by "%;j, "
;j,
and " ;j. Distortions inuence the local dynamics of the model by modi-
fying these elasticities relatively to the perfectly competitive case, through
the parameters ij and ij. By direct inspection of (7), we may immedi-
ately deduce that distortions a¤ecting the % function do not play a major
role, since "%;i appears in J always multiplied by , a parameter that takes
rather small values when the period of time considered is short. In contrast,
distortions a¤ecting the   and/or the 
 function can signicantly inuence
the dynamic behavior of our system. Major di¤erences with respect to the
perfectly competitive case are that, with distortions (see (3) and (6)), " ;L
may become lower than 1 ( ;L < 0 under  large) and 1 + "
;L may take
values greater than 1 (L;L > 0 under  large). As we shall see, due to this,
and in contrast to the perfectly competitive case, indeterminacy is possible
even with arbitrarily small distortions in the   and/or the 
 functions when
capital and labor are not weak substitutes ( large).9
We characterize the role of market distortions on local stability properties
using the geometrical method developed in Grandmont et al. (1998), i.e. we
analyze how T and D change in the space (T;D), according to the di¤erent
values taken by the parameters of the model. See gures 1 to 3. Note
that T and D correspond, respectively, to the sum and product of the two
eigenvalues of J , i.e. the two roots of the associated characteristic polynomial
P ()  2 T +D = 0. Hence, along the line (AB), one eigenvalue is equal
to  1, i.e. P ( 1)  1 + T +D = 0. Also, on the line (AC) one eigenvalue
is equal to 1, i.e. P (1)  1   T + D = 0, and on the segment [BC], the
two eigenvalues are complex conjugates with a unit modulus, i.e. D = 1
and jT j < 2. It can be deduced that the steady state is a sink, with both
absolute eigenvalues lower than 1, when D < 1 and jT j < 1 +D, i.e., when
(T;D) is inside the triangle ABC. It is a saddle-point, when j1 +Dj <
jT j. Otherwise, it is a source (locally unstable). Since K is a predetermined
variable (see Denition 1), the steady state is locally indeterminate when it is
a sink. These gures are also useful to study the occurrence of bifurcations.
Considering that a parameter of the model is made to continuously vary in
its admissible range (for instance " 2 [1;+1)), a transcritical bifurcation
9To see this, take as a rst approximation  arbitrarily close to zero, so that D 
" ;L=(1 + "
;L). Distortions on 
 and   easily allow D to take values lower than 1, a
required condition for indeterminacy. On the contrary, under perfect competition this is
not possible for  large since from (3) " ;L = " > 1 and 0 < 1 + "
;L = 1 + "!;L < 1 for
 > s > (1  s).
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generically occurs when (T;D) crosses the line (AC) (" crossing the critical
value "T ).
10 When (T;D) crosses the line (AB) (" crossing the critical value
"F ), a ip bifurcation generically occurs. When (T;D) crosses the segment
[BC] in its interior (" crossing the critical value "H ), a Hopf bifurcation
generically occurs.11
In our case the analysis of the changes in T and D is quite complex, since
we have 16 parameters and the expressions of T and D are nonlinear in some
of them. Therefore, to simplify our task, we impose some conditions on the
parameters that are veried, not only under perfect competition, but also for
most of the distortions considered in the literature (see Section 4). They are
formalized in the following assumptions:
Assumption 2
(LK + s) =
(1 s KK)(s LL)
(1 s+KL) and  K =   L
1 s KK
1 s+KL .
Assumption 3
K;K( ;L L;L) = K;L( ;K L;K); i.e., 1+D1(+1) T1(+1) = 0.
where T1 and D1 denote respectively the values of T and D when " = 1,
and T1(+1) and D1(+1) denote the values of T1 and D1 when  tends to
+1.12 Using (6)-(7) and Assumptions 2 and 3, T and D can be written as
follows:
T =

(1 + LL)  (s  LL)
("   1) + T1 with
T1  1 + f[(1 + KK) (1 +  L)   KKL] +  L
  [(1 + LL)(1  s  KK) + KK(s  LL) + LK(1  s+ KL)
+ KL
(1  s  KK)(s  LL)
1  s+ KL
]g=f(1 + LL)  (s  LL)g
(8)
10The case of a saddle node bifurcation is ruled out, since we apply our analysis to
(K;L) = (1; 1) whose existence is persistent, under the usual scaling procedure. Also,
related works with constant elasticities  and  (eg. Cazzavillan et al. (1998) and Kuhry
(2001)) found at most two steady states, which rules out pitchfork bifurcations. Hence,
for the sake of simplicity we disregard pitchfork bifurcations.
11The expressions of "T , "F and "H are given in Appendix 6.3.4.
12Assumption 2 implies that the numerator and the denominator of T and D depend
linearly on the elasticity of capital-labor substitution , while Assumption 3, by referring
to Figures 1-3, implies that the point (T1(+1; D1(+1)) is on line (AC):
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D =
(1 + KK)  (1  s  KK)
(1 + LL)  (s  LL)
("   1) +D1 with
D1  f[(1 + KK)(1 +  L)   KKL] +  L
  [(1  s  KK)(1 +  L) +  K(1  s+ KL)
  KL L
1  s  KK
1  s+ KL
  KK L]g=f(1 + LL)  (s  LL)g
(9)
For future reference note that, under Assumption 1, D is increasing in
". Also, it can be easily checked that D1 is a decreasing function of  when
 L > 

 L, with 

 L dened below in Assumption 4. Since the inequality
 L > 

 L is veried in the absence of distortions (i.e., when ij = ij = 0
for all i and j) or when distortions are su¢ ciently small (i.e., all ij and ij
su¢ ciently close to zero), being also satised if distortions do not inuence
  (i.e., when  j =  j = 0 for all j), and in most of the examples presented
in Section 4, we will impose it:
Assumption 4
 L > 

 L   1 
(1 + L;L) ;L   (s  L;L) ;KK;L
(s  L;L)(1 + K;K)  (1 + L;L)(1  s  K;K)
+
(1 + L;L)
h
 ;K(1  s+ K;L)  K;L ;L 1 s K;K1 s+K;L   K;K ;L
i
(s  L;L)(1 + K;K)  (1 + L;L)(1  s  K;K)
The following Lemma summarizes the previous discussion:
Lemma 1 Under Assumptions 1-3, D is an increasing function of " 2
[1;1). Also, under Assumptions 1-4, D1 is a decreasing function of  2
s LL
1+LL
;1

. Furthermore, Assumption 4 is veried whenever any of the
following conditions is satised: (i) either distortions are (arbitrarily) small
or (ii) distortions do not a¤ect  .
Before proceeding with the full characterization of the local stability prop-
erties, we discuss some necessary conditions for the occurrence of indetermi-
nacy, that will help us understanding the role of distortions on local dynamics.
3.3 Necessary Conditions for Indeterminacy
As stated above, local indeterminacy occurs when the point (T;D) lies inside
the triangleABC: Therefore the conditionsD < 1,D > T 1 andD >  T 1
are necessary for the occurrence of indeterminacy (See Figure 1). Using
Assumption 1 and (8)-(9) we can easily see that under perfect competition,
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when capital and labor are not weak substitutes (i.e. for  > s >  (1  s)),
the rst two conditions are not satised. Hence, we have the following result:
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, local indeterminacy is not possible in
the absence of distortions.
With distortions, even if they are small enough, this result may be re-
versed. As shown below, this requires that distortions satisfy the following
inequalities:
Assumption 5
1.  L < H L  LL+( KKL KK)1+KK , i.e. D1 (+1) < 1
2.  L <  L f[KK+KL (1 s KK)(1 s+KL) ] (s  LL+ L)+(1  s  KK)LL
+(LK  K) (1  s+ KL)g=f1  s  KKg, i.e. D1 > T1   1.
Let us rst show that, under Assumptions 1-4, the indeterminacy condi-
tion D < 1 requires Assumption 5.1. Since, given Lemma 1, D is increasing
in " = 1, D1 is the lowest possible value of D; i.e., D > D1, so that D < 1
requires D1 < 1: Since D1 is decreasing in  >
s LL
1+LL
, we further obtain
D1 > D1(+1). Therefore, D can only take values below 1 if D1(+1) < 1,
i.e., if Assumption 5.1 is satised. In addition, the condition D1 < 1, using
(9) and Assumption 1, is equivalent to  > H1, with H1 given by (18) in
Appendix 6.3.3. Hence, we obtain the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1-4, indeterminacy requires Assumption
5.1 and  > H1 (so that D may become lower than 1).
Using also Lemma 1, we have the following Corollary:
Corollary 1 Under Assumptions 1-3, indeterminacy requires Assumption
5.1 and  > H1 whenever any of the following conditions is satised: (i)
either distortions are (arbitrarily) small or (ii) distortions do not a¤ect  .
A direct implication of these results is that if distortions are su¢ ciently
weak and do not inuence the % function, then LL >  L is a necessary
condition for indeterminacy. Hence, indeterminacy cannot occur with LL =
 L = 0, and the existence of distortions through labor are crucial when
distortions are small.
Let us now focus on the role of Assumption 5.2 for the indeterminacy
conditionD > T 1. Using (8)-(9) and Assumption 1, note that D > T 1 is
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equivalent to
K;K (1 s K;K)
(1+L;L) (s L;L) (   1)+A > 0, withA 
( ;L  ;L)(1 s K;K)
(1+L;L) (s L;L) .
Hence, if K;K < K;K 
 
1  s  K;K

=, D can only be higher than T 1
if A > 0 or, equivalently under Assumption 1, if  ;L >  ;L. Accordingly
we obtain the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 Under Assumptions 1-3, when KK  KK 
 
1  s  K;K

=,
indeterminacy requires Assumption 5.2 (so that D may become higher than
T   1).
Under Assumption 1, KK > 0 and, therefore, the condition KK  KK
is satised whenever KK  0, or KK > 0 but su¢ ciently close to zero. We
immediately derive the following Corollary:
Corollary 2 Under Assumptions 1-3, indeterminacy requires Assumption
5.2 if any of the following conditions is satised: (i) either KK  0 (ii) or
distortions are arbitrarily small (iii) or distortions do not inuence %.
From Corollary 2, when distortions do not inuence   and K;K  0,
Assumption 5.2 implies that at least one of the parameters fL;L; LK ; KLg
is positive. As an implication, indeterminacy is ruled out if L;L, L;K , K;L
and K;K are all negative.
Corollaries 1 and 2 show that Assumption 5 is required for the occur-
rence of indeterminacy with small distortions, when inputs are su¢ ciently
substitutes, as required by Assumption 1.
Using all the results above we can already emphasize the relative impor-
tance of each type of distortions. If there are only distortions on %, then
from Corollary 1 indeterminacy requires K;K < 0 (Assumption 5.1) and,
therefore, from Corollary 2 indeterminacy requires that K;L is above a pos-
itive lower bound, given by  K;K (1  s+ KL) = (1  s+ KK) (Assump-
tion 5.2). Accordingly we have the following Proposition:
Proposition 4 Under Assumptions 1-3, if there are only arbitrarily small
distortions in the % function, or if distortions only inuence either K;K or
K;L, Assumption 5 cannot be veried and indeterminacy cannot occur.
Indeed, as explained in the beginning of this section, the e¤ects on local
dynamics of distortions a¤ecting % are minor, so that market imperfections
inuencing the % function are not expected to play a major role for the
occurrence of indeterminacy. In contrast, since both Assumptions 5.1 and
5.2 can be easily satised with only arbitrarily small distortions on 
 (with
LL > 0) and/or on   (with  L < 0), distortions in these functions play an
important role in the emergence of indeterminacy and bifurcations, as shown
in the next section.
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3.4 Results on Indeterminacy and Bifurcations
The full characterization of the local stability properties of the model in
terms of the relevant parameters is provided in Proposition 5 and Table 1
below. Our results are derived assuming also that:
Assumption 6  L > L L   2+LL ( KKL KK)1+KK i.e. D1 (+1) >  1.
This Assumption is always veried if distortions are small enough, only
inuence % and/or 
, or only inuence   provided that  L does not take
large negative values ( L >  2).13 Hence, in order to simplify the exposition
and the analysis, in the following we consider that Assumption 6 is satised.
As explained in the Appendix, our results are obtained using the geomet-
rical method developed in Grandmont et al. (1998), i.e. we analyzed how
T and D evolve in the space (T;D) as " 2 [1;1), the bifurcation parame-
ter, continuously varies in its admissible range. Note that Assumptions 4-6
imply that we focus on values for  L such that Max

 L; 
L
 L
	
<  L <
Min

 L; 
H
 L
	
.14
Proposition 5 Let (K;L) = (1; 1) be the normalized steady state of the
dynamic system (4)-(5), as stated in Proposition 9. Consider that Assump-
tions 1-3 are veried, and that Max

 L; 
L
 L
	
<  L < Min

 L; 
H
 L
	
so that Assumptions 4-6 are also satised. Let  L further take admissible
values in intervals, that we call congurations, specied by referring to the
critical values b L and 
c
 L, whose expressions are given in Appendix 6.3.1.
Let  2

s LL
1+LL
;+1

take values in intervals specied by referring to the
critical values T ; F , H1, H2, and H3 dened in Appendix 6.3.3., and
let " 2 [1;1) take values in intervals specied by referring to the critical
values "H ; "F and "T given in Appendix 6.3.4. Consider further that As-
sumptions 7 and 8 are satised whenever KK > 0, and that Assumption 9
is veried when KK  0 and  L < c L.15 Then, the nature of the steady
13Assumption 6, together with Assumptions 3 and 5.1, implies that (T1 (+1) ; D1 (+1))
is a point on the line (AC), between A and C. See Figures 1-3. The reader may later check
that, in all the examples presented, this Assumption is indeed implied by Assumptions 1
and/or 4.
14A su¢ cient condition for non emptiness of this interval is that distortions (other
than those represented by  L), are small enough. Indeed, if KL = KK = LL =
LK =  K = 0 and ij = 0 for i = K;L;  and j = K;L, we have Max

 L; 
L
 L
	
=
 1 < Min L; H L	 = 0. Therefore, by continuity, Min L; H L	 is still higher than
Max

 L; 
L
 L
	
for values of those parameters close to zero.
15These Assumptions are used merely as an exposition device. Assumptions 7 and 8,
which are presented in Appendix 6.2 Conguration (i), are only relevant in the case of
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state, whether a saddle, a sink or a source, depends upon the values of the
parameters  L; KK,  and " belonging to the intervals indicated in Table
1.16 Also, whenever the critical value "H (resp. "F or "T ) appears in some
row of Table 1 a Hopf bifurcation (resp. a ip or transcritical bifurcation)
generically occurs as " crosses the corresponding value.
Proof. See Appendix 6.2
We start the discussion of the results with two remarks. First, Proposition
5 does not cover the case of perfect competition, since Assumption 5 can
only be veried if there are distortions. Second, distortions a¤ecting only %,
through either K;K or K;L, are also not covered by Proposition 5, since in
this situation, according to Proposition 4, Assumption 5 is not satised. In
any case, as shown in Propositions 1 and 4, indeterminacy would not occur
in those situations.
In contrast, from Table 1, indeterminacy and bifurcations may occur in
the presence of market distortions, under Assumptions 1-6. Indeterminacy
(sink) requires values of the elasticity of substitution between capital and
labor () and of the elasticity of labor supply (1= ("   1)) above certain
lower bounds. Of course, given Proposition 2, the lower bound on  is higher
or equal to H1. Also, Hopf and/or transcritical bifurcations are possible in
all congurations.
There are however di¤erences across congurations: (a) The lower bound
on  required for indeterminacy is equal to H1 in congurations (i)   (ii),
while it is identical to H3 > H1 in conguration (iii); (b) Flip bifurcations
are only possible in congurations (ii) and (iii); However, (c) indeterminacy
can only occur through a ip bifurcation in conguration (iii); (d) Finally,
while an upper bound on " is always required for indeterminacy, in con-
guration (iii) a lower bound on " may be needed in some cases: when
 2 (H3; F ), indeterminacy only emerges for " > "F > 1: The latter
result is important per se, since it implies that imposing an innitely elastic
labor supply at the individual level (" = 1) may not be appropriate to fully
understand the implications of market distortions on local indeterminacy.
product market imperfections discussed in Section 4.2.1, being veried for reasonable val-
ues for  and for the distortions parameters (see Table 2). Assumption 9 is presented in
Appendix 6.2 Conguration (iii). It is only relevant in the case of labor market imperfec-
tions discussed in Section 4.2.3, being veried in all the examples.
16In Table 1, when KK = 0, the lines with a * disappear if H2 2

(s LL)
(1+LL)
;+1

does
not exist, the upper limit of  in the preceding line becoming +1: See Appendix 6.2 and
6.4.
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 L< Min

 L; 
H
 L
	
"
 L> Max

 L; 
L
 L
	
 Saddle Sink Source
Conguration (i) 1) K;K  0

s LL
1+LL
; H1
i
("T ;1) -

1; "T

 L> 
b
 L (H1 ; H2) ("T ;1)

1; "H

("H ; "T )
* (H2 ;1) ("T ;1)

1; "T

-
2) K;K > 0

s LL
1+LL
; H1
i
("T ;1) -

1; "T

(H1 ; T ) ("T ;1)

1; "H

("H ; "T )
(T ;1) -

1; "H

("H ;1)
Conguration (ii) 1) K;K  0

s LL
1+LL
; F
 
1; "F

- ("F ; "T )
c L<  L< 
b
 L and ("T ;1)
[F ; H1 ] ("T ;1) -

1; "T

(H1 ; H2) ("T ;1)

1; "H

("H ; "T )
* (H2 ;1) ("T ;1)

1; "T

-
2) K;K > 0

s LL
1+LL
; F
 
1; "F

- ("F ; "T )
and ("T ;1)
[F ; H1 ] ("T ;1) -

1; "T

(H1 ; T ) ("T ;1)

1; "H

("H ; "T )
[T ;1) -

1; "H

("H ;1)
Conguration (iii) 1) K;K  0

s LL
1+LL
; H3
 
1; "F

- ("F ; "T )
 L< 
c
 L and ("T ;1)
(H3 ; F )

1; "F

("F ; "H ) ("H ; "T )
and ("T ;1)
[F ; H2) ("T ;1)

1; "H

("H ; "T )
* (
H2
;1) ("T ;1)

1; "T
  
2) K;K > 0

s LL
1+LL
; H3
 
1; "F
   ("F ; "T )
and ("T ;1)
(H3 ; F )

1; "F

("F ; "H ) ("H ; "T )
and ("T ;1)
[F ; T ) ("T ;1)

1; "H

("H ; "T )
[T ;1)

1; "H

("H ;1)
Table 1: Local stability properties and bifurcations
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We now discuss the role of the di¤erent distortions on the results obtained.
We start by noting that, under Assumption 1 the critical value b L, which
separates congurations (i) and (ii), is negative in the absence of distortions
(see (13) in Appendix 6.3.1). Hence, if distortions are small enough we will
always obtain conguration (i). Note also that, in the absence of distortions
on  , b L becomes equal to  1 for  h 0. Hence, since the values taken by 
are typically rather low, conguration (i) is also the relevant one when there
are only distortions on %, or on 
, or on both. This is summarized in the
following Corollary.
Corollary 3 Assume that Proposition 5 applies. Conguration (i) is always
obtained if: i) either distortions are arbitrarily small, or ii) in the absence of
distortions on   for a su¢ ciently low :
As already referred, distortions inuencing the % function do not critically
inuence local dynamics, a result that is also apparent in Proposition 5.
Indeed, within each conguration, K;K being positive or negative does not
change the critical lower bound on  above which indeterminacy may occur
(H1 in Congurations (i)-(ii), and H3 in Conguration (iii)). In contrast,
distortions in the 
 and   functions play a crucial role for indeterminacy.
In fact, although Assumption 5 cannot be veried and indeterminacy is not
possible with only arbitrarily small distortions on % (see Proposition 4), this is
no longer the case when small distortions inuence 
, or  , or both. Indeed,
in the absence of distortions on %, Assumption 5 is satised with (arbitrarily)
small values of L;L,  ;L,  ;K and L;K , provided they are such that  ;K 
L;K  0, L;L > 0 and/or  ;L < 0 and, therefore, provided also that L;L 
 ;L is small and positive.17 Applying Proposition 5 and using Corollary 3
(condition i), we obtain conguration (i). Hence, indeterminacy occurs when
 exceeds H1 and for  below H or T: However, when distortions become
arbitrarily small,18 H1 ! +1 (see (18), so that indeterminacy requires an
arbitrarily large . In this case "H ! 1 and "T ! 1 (see (21), (23) in
Appendix 6.3.3 and 6.3.4) and the following result is obtained.
Corollary 4 Assume that Proposition 5 applies. Indeterminacy occurs with
arbitrarily small distortions in 
 and/or  , if and only if  ;K L;K  0,and
either L;L > 0 or  ;L < 0, and the elasticity of capital-labor substitution
and the elasticity of private labor supply are arbitrarily large.
17All the other Assumptions of Proposition 5 are also veried when we only have arbi-
trarily small distortions in 
 and/or  .
18Note that in this case  ;L ! 0,  ;L ! 0, H ;L ! 0 and, under Assumption 5,
 ;L    ;L ! 0+ and H ;L    ;L ! 0+.
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This corollary, together with Proposition 4 suggests that a minimal degree
of distortions is required for indeterminacy to occur with plausible values of
the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. In Section 4 we
discuss this minimal degree of distortions for each example considered.
Another conclusion worth emphasizing is that, while distortions on 
 and
  seem to play a similar (symmetric) role on indeterminacy when they are
small, this is no longer the case when these distortions take higher values.
Indeed, (non arbitrarily small) distortions on   play a crucial role for the
occurrence of ip bifurcations. From Corollary 3 we see that in the absence
of distortions on   we would obtain, for credible calibrations of the parame-
ters (low ), mainly conguration (i) where those bifurcations are ruled out.
Hence, since ip bifurcations are frequently a route for chaos, distortions af-
fecting the o¤er curve may be associated with complex chaotic behavior of
capital and labor/employment trajectories.
Finally, two remarks concerning the scope of our results are worth refer-
ring. First, our paper only deals with the role of market distortions on local
indeterminacy linked to the sink property, i.e. we do not address the cases
of static or global dynamic indeterminacy and bifurcations, which may also
appear in the presence of some market imperfections.19 Second, although we
only discuss local deterministic indeterminacy and bifurcations, associated
with the emergence of deterministic or cycles, we may construct stochastic
sunspot equilibria, i.e. expectation driven uctuations, along indeterminacy
and/or ip/Hopf bifurcations,20 as shown in Grandmont et al. (1998).21
4 Applications
We now present several examples of specic distortions that provide micro-
economic foundations for the model developed above. Many of them have
already been studied in the literature, but not always in a nance constrained
Woodford economy. In Section 4.1 we describe the examples and we repre-
19Static indeterminacy is considered by Dos Santos Ferreira and Dufourt (2006), Dos
Santos Ferreira and Lloyd-Braga (2008) and Wang and Wen (2008) to explain expectation-
driven uctuations. Drugeon and Wigniolle (1996) and Gali (1995) obtain multiplicities
from the analysis of global dynamics.
20Note that sunspots cycles obtained along Hopf or ip bifurcations, with characteristic
roots of the linearized system close to one, will tend to exhibit endogenous persistency, a
feature present in real data.
21However, under some specic market failures, with strategic interactions between
agents, our parameters ij and ij may become stochastic in the presence of extrinsic
uncertainty and, in this case, the results provided in Grandmont et al. (1998) may no
longer be applicable.
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sent them according to our general approach, showing that some of them
have equivalent representations. In Section 4.2 we apply our results to un-
derstand in which cases indeterminacy can occur for plausible values of the
elasticity of capital-labor substitution.
4.1 Specic Distortions and Equivalence Results
For each example, we start by identifying the %(K;L), 
(K;L) and  (K;L)
functions. We then compute the elasticities of these three functions with
respect to K and L, evaluated at the steady state and, using (6), we identify
the parameters ij and ij for i = K;L;  and j = K;L as functions of
parameters that represent the specic distortions in each example.22
We also emphasize that there are classes of specic distortions which have
equivalent representations in terms of our distortions parameters. Since mar-
ket distortions inuence local dynamics through the parameters ij and ij,
equivalent market distortions share the same local dynamic properties and
indeterminacy mechanisms, even if their economic interpretations are di¤er-
ent. Our equivalence results have strong implications. If we estimate the
relevant parameters of our general formulation, we will not be able to iden-
tify a particular source of specic distortions among those, which belonging
to the same class, are observational equivalent. Also, even if indeterminacy
requires an empirically unreasonable degree of some specic distortion, the
associated indeterminacy mechanism is not necessarily unimportant, since
an equivalent empirically plausible model may exist. Another implication
is that simulations of equivalent linearized versions of the model with ad-
ditive shocks lead exactly to the same trajectories of aggregate capital and
labor (in deviations from the steady state) and, thereby, equilibrium cycli-
cal properties of variables that only depend on aggregate capital and labor
are, up to the rst order, identical in equivalent models. Finally, the dy-
namic e¤ects of one specic distortion may be compensated/eliminated by
the existence of another symmetric specic distortion belonging to the same
equivalence class. This last result suggests some policy implications. In-
deed, as we shall see below in Section 4.2.2, some forms of taxation eliminate
local indeterminacy and endogenous uctuations caused by the presence of
consumption externalities, so that distortionary taxes may be defended on
stability grounds.
22In all the examples, s, , " , (L); !(Kt 1=Lt), (Kt 1=Lt) and AF (Kt 1; Lt) are
dened as in Section 2.1.
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4.1.1 Examples with the same distortion on the real interest rate
and the real wage
Here we explore examples of output market distortions. In these examples,
the generalized o¤er curve coincides with the competitive one,  (K;L) =
(L); and the real interest rate and the real wage are a¤ected in the same
way, i.e. we have:

t = !tD(Kt 1; Lt) = A!(Kt 1=Lt)D(Kt 1; Lt)
%t = tD(Kt 1; Lt) = A(Kt 1=Lt)D(Kt 1; Lt)
where D(K;L) stands for the distortion introduced, so that "
;K = "D;K+ s ,
"
;L = "D;L  s , "%;K = "D;K  1 s , "%;L = "D;L+ 1 s . Using (6) the parameters
ij and ij for i = K;L and j = K;L are easily obtained.
Productive Externalities Productive externalities have often been intro-
duced in macro-dynamic models (Barinci and Chéron (2001), Benhabib and
Farmer (1994), Cazzavillan (2001), Cazzavillan et al. (1998)). In these pa-
pers all markets are perfectly competitive and rms face a private constant
returns to scale technology, but, due to positive externalities that a¤ect the
total productivity of factors, returns to scale are increasing at the social level.
Here, we will extend this formulation, allowing also for negative productive
externalities so that, at the social level, returns to scale can be decreasing.
We consider therefore that production is given by y = AF (K;L)(K;L),
where (K;L) stands for externalities, K (L) denoting average levels of
capital (labor). Since rms, when maximizing prots, take externalities
as given, at a symmetric equilibrium with K = K and L = L, we have
D(Kt 1; Lt) = (Kt 1; Lt). Denoting by ";i the elasticity of the function
(K;L) with respect to i = K;L, evaluated at the steady state, we obtain
L;L = K;L = ";L; L;K = K;K = ";K ;and  ;i = j;i = 0; i = K;L and
j = K;L; .
Output externalities can also be represented in this framework if we con-
sider (K;L) = Z

F (K;L)

; where F (K;L) is the average private level of
output. Dening the elasticity of Z with respect to F , z  "Z;F , we obtain
L;L = K;L = (1   s)z; L;K = K;K = sz. We can see that output exter-
nalities are a particular case of positive productive externalities, generating
the same values for ij; ij when ";L and ";K are such that z = ";L + ";K
with ";L=";K = (1  s) =s.
Imperfect competition in the product market We will now empha-
size that, from a local dynamics point of view, many models with imperfect
19
competition in the product market are, in fact, a particular case of the pre-
vious framework with positive productive externalities, corresponding more
precisely to the case of output externalities. Benhabib and Farmer (1994)
and Cazzavillan, Lloyd-Braga and Pintus (1998) underlined that this is the
case when imperfectly competitive economies are characterized by the ex-
istence of rms that have internal increasing returns (the private produc-
tion function being homogeneous in K and L of degree 1 + z > 1) associ-
ated with decreasing marginal costs (the cost function being homogeneous
of degree 1= (1 + z) < 1 in output). However, in these models, the equilib-
rium markup is constant, while several empirical studies (Bils (1987), Mar-
tins and Scarpetta (1999), Portier (1995), Rotemberg and Woodford (1991))
have shown that markups are typically countercyclical. Here, we show that
the same type of equivalence exists with models of imperfect competition
where markup variability is linked to strategic interactions between produc-
ers and business formation. In these models increasing returns are associ-
ated with a xed cost, each typical rm i = 1; :::; Nt producing according
to A [F (kit 1; lit)  ], where kit 1 (lit) represents capital (labor) used by
rm i and  > 0 is a xed cost. For the sake of exposition, we focus here
on markup variability applied in the context of Cournot competition under
free entry (where also the obtained elasticity of output market demand,  ,
is constant, as for instance in Seegmuller (2003) and Dos Santos Ferreira
and Lloyd-Braga (2005)). The number Nt of producers is determined by the
usual zero prot condition and the markup factor, at a symmetric equilib-
rium, is given by t =  (Nt)  NtNt 1 with (N)  0(N)N=(N) < 0.
Firms, maximizing prots, choose capital (and labor) such that the ratio of
the marginal productivity of capital (labor) over the markup factor equals
the real interest rate (wage). At equilibrium, the number of rms is pro-
cyclical, i.e. it is an increasing function of individual (and aggregate) pro-
duction, and can be written as a function of aggregate capital K = Nk
and labor L = Nl, i.e., Nt = N(Yt) =
q
Yt

with Yt  F (Kt 1; Lt) and
N(Y )  N 0(Y )Y=N(Y ) > 0. As a result the markup is countercyclical,
and the same distortion D(Kt 1; Lt) = 1=(N(Kt 1; Lt)) a¤ects both the
real wage and the real interest rate. Dening    (N)N(Y ) > 0, we
obtain, L;L = K;L = (1   s); L;K = K;K = s and  ;i = j;i = 0; for
i = K;L and j = K;L; . Comparing with positive productive externalities,
with output externalities and with models of constant markup, we can state
the following result.
Proposition 6 Models with imperfect competition in the product market
with countercyclical markup variability (characterized by  > 0), as described
above, have equivalent representation, in terms of our general framework,
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to models with positive productive externalities (";L > 0, ";K > 0) when
 = ";L + ";K with ";K=";L = s= (1  s), and have equivalent represen-
tation to models with positive output externalities or to models of constant
markup (characterized by z > 0) when  = z.
In fact, this equivalence can be extended to several other types of imper-
fectly competitive output markets with markup variability. The equivalence
applies, for instance, under free entry with monopolistic competition where
aggregate consumption (see Seegmuller (2009) or aggregate output (see Dos
Santos Ferreira and Lloyd-Braga (2005), Kuhry (2001), Weder (2000a))) is
given by a function à la Dixit-Stiglitz in several di¤erentiated goods, each
good being produced under a xed cost as described above. It also applies
to models with taste for variety dened as, following Benassy (1996), the
consumer utility gain of consuming one unit of all the Nt available varieties
of goods instead of consuming Nt units of a single variety (Jacobsen (1998),
Seegmuller (2008)). However, in this case  represents the ratio between the
aggregate price and the price set by a single rm, instead of representing
the markup factor. Of course, the precise functional forms of  (Nt), (N),
N(Yt) and N(Y ) depend on the specic model considered.
Finally let us remark that this equivalence must also hold in several di¤er-
ent types of macrodynamic models and not only in the Woodford framework,
as long as capital and labor demand are derived from (static) prot maxi-
mization as in our model.
4.1.2 Examples with di¤erent distortions on the real interest rate
and e¤ective consumption
The examples considered here are capital market distortions (capital income
taxation), labor market distortions (labor income taxation) and output mar-
ket distortions (consumption externalities). These distortions still do not
a¤ect the generalized o¤er curve ( (K;L) = (L)), but now the real interest
rate and e¤ective consumption are not a¤ected in the same way, i.e. we have:

t = !tD1(Kt 1; Lt) = A!(Kt 1=Lt)D1(Kt 1; Lt)
%t = tD2(Kt 1; Lt) = A(Kt 1=Lt)D2(Kt 1; Lt)
so that "
;K = "D1;K +
s

, "
;L = "D1;L   s , "%;K = "D2;K   1 s , "%;L =
"D2;L +
1 s

. See (6).
Public spending nanced by variable taxation In this example we
consider a perfectly competitive economy where public expenditures, nanced
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by variable taxation under a balanced budget rule, are introduced. This
example follows closely, although extending it by also considering capital
income taxation, the work of Lloyd-Braga et al. (2008), and covers as par-
ticular cases the scal policy rules considered in Dromel and Pintus (2008),
Guo and Lansing (1998), Gokan (2005), Pintus (2003), Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (1997), among others. The government can levy taxes on capital
income (tKt 1) and labor income (!tLt). Real public spending in goods
and services in period t, Gt  0, is given by the balanced budget rule
Gt = L (!tLt)!tLt + K (tKt 1) tKt 1. Tax rates on labor and capital
incomes are determined respectively by the scal policy rules L (!tLt) 
zL (!tLt=!L)
L and K (tKt 1)  zK (tKt 1=K)K , with parameters zi 2
(0; 1) and i 2 R for i = L;K, and where !L and K are respectively the
wage bill and capital income, both evaluated at the steady state. Note that
zi represents the tax rate at the steady state and that i denotes the elastic-
ity of the tax rate with respect to the tax base. When i = 0 the tax rate
is constant at the level zi. Since the unique di¤erence with respect to the
perfectly competitive economy is that now the real wage received by workers
is given by !t
h
1  zL (!tLt=!L)L
i
instead of !t and the real interest rate
received by capitalists is given by t
h
1  zK (tKt 1=K)K
i
instead of t,
we obtain:
D1(Kt 1; Lt) = 1  zL (!tLt=!L)L
D2(Kt 1; Lt) = 1  zK (tKt 1=K)K
In the following, we will address separately each type of taxation.
In the case of capital taxation market distortions only appear in the
function %(K;L), i.e. D1(K;L) = 1: We get j;i = j;i = 0 for i = K;L and
j = L; ; K;K =  K zK1 zK ; K;L = 0 and K;K =  K;K(1  s) =  K;L.
In the case of labor income taxation distortions only a¤ect e¤ective con-
sumption 
(K;L); i.e. D2(K;L) = 1. We have j;i = j;i = 0 for i = K;L
and j = K; ; L;L =  L zL1 zL ; L;K = 0 and L;L =  L;Ls =  L;K .
Consumption externalities Consumption externalities correspond to the
idea that the individual utility of consumption is a¤ected by the current
consumption of others (envy or altruism), so that aggregate or average con-
sumption becomes an argument of the utility function (Alonso-Carrera et al.
(2008), Gali (1994), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), Weder (2000b)). Here, we
consider that individual workers compare their own consumption to that of
the average worker, so that workersutility is given by U(Cwt+1'(C
w
t+1)=B) 
V (Lt); where C
w
t+1 denotes workersaverage consumption and '(C
w
t+1) the
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externality function. Accordingly, at equilibrium we have Cw = Cw and
D1(Kt 1; Lt) = '(Cwt ): Denoting by  be the elasticity of ' with respect
to Cw, evaluated at the steady state, we have L;L = ; L;K = 0, L;L =
 L;Ls =  L;K . Comparing with the example on labor taxation, we have
the following result.
Proposition 7 Models with consumption externalities in preferences where
individual workers compare their own consumption to that of the average
worker (characterized by ) and models with labor income taxation (L; zL)
described above, have equivalent representations in terms of our general frame-
work when  =  L zL1 zL .
Note that, when individual workers compare their own consumption to
that of the average consumer, we have an equivalence with models with
consumption taxation of the type proposed by Lloyd-Braga et al. (2008).
4.1.3 Examples with distortions on the generalized o¤er curve
We start with examples where distortions only modify the o¤er curve (leisure
externalities and unemployment insurance with e¢ ciency wages) and proceed
with an example where e¤ective consumption is also a¤ected (unemployment
benets and unions).
Leisure externalities The idea behind leisure externalities is that an in-
dividuals utility from leisure (or disutility of labor) is a¤ected by the amount
of leisure consumed (or labor supplied) by others. For the sake of simplicity,
let the utility function of a worker be written as Cwt+1=B   L

t L

t , where
  1 corresponds to the elasticity of the o¤er curve in the absence of dis-
tortions,  2 R is a constant parameter and Lt denotes aggregate labor,
taken as given by individual workers, but modifying their welfare. Since at
equilibrium Lt = Lt, the generalized o¤er curve becomes  (K;L) = L+:
Solving the model we get ji = ji = 0 for fi; jg = fK;L g;  L =   K =
0 and  L = . This example covers, as particular cases, the type of leisure
externalities considered by Benhabib and Farmer (2000) and Weder (2004),
where  < 0, implying that the (private marginal) desutility of labor is lower
when others also work more. Note that in this case the elasticity of the gen-
eralized o¤er curve becomes lower than  and therefore it can take values
lower than 1, in contrast to the perfectly competitive case. If, for instance,
" = 1 and  < 0 we obtain " L < 1, as it happens in the model explored in
Grandmont (2008) that we present below.
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Unemployment insurance and e¢ ciency wages Grandmont (2008)
introduces unemployment insurance in a Woodford economy with e¢ ciency
wages (see also Coimbra (1999) and Nakajima (2006)), distorting only the
generalized o¤er curve. There is a continuum of identical workers of mass
1, with disutility from e¤ort, labor is indivisible and unemployed workers
receive a constant percentage z of the wage, nanced by a uniform tax rate
on income of all workers, both, the benets and the tax rate, taken as given
by individuals. The e¢ ciency wage contracting involves a level of e¤ort,
x, and a level of consumption of employed workers, C, both constant over
time (depending only on z). Therefore, there is a constant reservation wage
at the private level, so that " = 1. In this model,   (K;L) is identical to
aggregate consumption of employed and unemployed workers, i.e.,   (K;L) =
Cn + C(1   n)z, where n = L=x denotes the steady state employment
rate. We get " K = 0 and 0 < " L =
(1 z)n
z+(1 z)n < 1. Hence,  L =
 z
z+(1 z)n ,
 L =  L =  K = 0; ji = ji = 0 for fi; jg = fK;L g: Comparing this
economy with the one with leisure externalities we can state the following:
Proposition 8 Assuming " = 1; the model with unemployment benets and
e¢ ciency wages (characterized by 1 > z > 0; n > 0) and the model with ex-
ternalities in leisure ( < 0) ; described above, have equivalent representations
in terms of our general framework when  1 <  z
z+(1 z)n =  < 0.
Unions and unemployment benets We end this section presenting an
example with labor market imperfections, where both  (K;L) and 
(K;L)
are a¤ected by market distortions. This example is provided by the model
developed in Dufourt et al. (2008) that introduces unions and unemployment
benets in the Woodford nance constrained framework (see also Lloyd-
Braga and Modesto (2007)). There is a continuum of identical workers,
labor is indivisible and workers have no labor desutility. A constant real
benet b > 0 is paid to each unemployed in t nanced by a real tax  > 0
on each employed worker at t, both being received and paid at t + 1, i.e.,
b(1   L) = L. Firms rst decide the amount of capital services to rent
and then wages and employment are determined through an e¢ cient bargain
between unions and rms. Agents take b and  as given, and unions, willing
to maximize the consumption of an average worker, are able to set wages
paid by rms above a reservation wage RW (given by RWt = (b+ )
pt+1
pt
),
with a markup factor (K;L) = 1 s(K;L)
1 s(K;L)  1, increasing in the (constant)
bargaining power of unions (1   ) 2 [0; 1). Employment is determined by
the equality between the reservation wage and the marginal productivity of
labor, i.e., RW t = !(Kt 1=Lt). Note that the case of a perfectly competitive
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labor market would be obtained with  = 1 leading to (K;L) = 1. Capital
is determined by the equality between the real interest rate and the marginal
productivity of capital multiplied by the rmsbargaining power, . Recall
that money demand in every period t is identical to the respective wage bill
((Kt 1 ; Lt)!(Kt 1=Lt)Lt) and money supply is constant over time. From
monetary equilibrium we obtain pt+1
pt
=
(Kt 1 ;Lt)!(Kt 1=Lt)Lt)
(Kt;Lt+1)!(Kt=Lt+1)Lt+1)
. Hence, given
the equations that determine real wages, employment and real interest rates,
we are able to identify this model within our general framework, obtaining:

(Kt 1; Lt) = (Kt 1=Lt)A!(Kt 1=Lt)
%(Kt 1; Lt) = A(Kt 1=Lt)
 (Kt 1;Lt) = b(Kt 1=Lt)
Because of the existence of a constant reservation wage at the individual
level, we have  = 1 and, since ";K =  ";L = s(1 s)1 s ( 1) ; after some
computations we get K;j = K;j = 0 for j = K;L,
23  ;K = L;K =  L;L =
  ;K = L;L =  L;K =  ;L = s(1 )1 s 2 (0; s), and  ;L = L;L   1.
4.2 Discussing the Examples: The minimal degree of
distortions required for indeterminacy
In this section we apply the results obtained in Proposition 5 to the examples
presented in the preceding section. In Table 2 we summarize the assumptions
and congurations obtained in terms of parameters that represent the specic
distortions considered in each example, focusing mainly on Assumptions 1
and 5.24 This table only covers the basic examples, the others being easily
recovered using our equivalence Propositions.
As referred in Section 3.3, a minimal degree of distortions is required for
the occurrence of indeterminacy with plausible values for the elasticity of
substitution between capital and labor. Here, using Table 2 and Proposition
23This means that, in terms of local dynamics, the model is as if %(Kt 1; Lt) is not
a¤ected by distortions.
24In all the examples presented, Assumptions 2 and 3 are always satised. Also, under
Assumption 1, Assumption 4 is veried in all examples, except in the case of leisure exter-
nalities where it requires a not too negative degree of externalities. It can also be checked
that, under Assumptions 1 and 4, Assumption 6 is also satised in all the examples. Note
also that Assumptions 7 and 8 only apply in the case of output market imperfections, and
in particular in the case of productive externalities presented in Table 2, where K;K > 0.
Finally, Assumption 9 only applies in the case of labor market imperfections (in partic-
ular in the case of leisure externalities and unemployment benets with unions) where
Conguration (iii) exists, being always satised in those examples.
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Parameters Assumption 1 Assumption 5 Congurations obtained
(1  s) < s <1
2
Productive Externalities Extending Ass. 1 to
";L= L;L= K;L ";L>  1 ";L> ";K ";L> 0; ";K> 0;
";K= L;K= K;K ";K>  1 ";L+";K> 0 [(1 + ";L)(1  s+ ";L
[(1 + ";L)(1  s) +";K)  s";K ] < s
 s";K ] < s Ass. 7 requires we obtain conguration (i)
 > s
1+";L
";L>
s
1 s";K and Ass. 8 is satised
Labor Taxation
0 < zL< 1; L  1 < L zL1 zL< 1 L
zL
1 zL< 0 Extending Ass. 1 to
L;L=  L zL1 zL  > s implying L< 0 3(1  s) < 2s
L;L=  L;K=  L;Ls we obtain conguration (i)
Leisure Externalities As Ass. 4 implies  >  1
 =  ;L  > s  < 0 we obtain conguration:
(i) for b L<  < 0,
(ii) for c L<  < 
b
 L;
(iii ) for  1 <  < c ;L;
b L  1+ (1 s)2s (1 s)
c L2[s (1 s)](1 s)
 2
p
s[s (1 s)]]
(1 s)
Unemployment benets
and unions We obtain congurations
0 <   1;"= 1 (1  s) < s (i ) and (ii)
L;L=   s(1 )1 s  > s for (1 s)s <  < 
 ;L= L;L 1 and conguration (iii)
i;K=  L;L for <   1; where
i;L=  i;K=  L;L   1  (1 s)s(4 ) :
for i =  ; L
Table 2: Assumptions and congurations expressed in terms of the parame-
ters of the specic examples
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5, we discuss this minimal degree of distortions, focusing particularly in the
case of a Cobb Douglas technology ( = 1). Our numerical examples are
obtained considering that  = (1=1:03)
1
4 and  = 0:1=4, which is consistent
with most calibrations used in the business cycle literature for quarterly
data. Hence,  = 0:03475, and we x s = 0:35, so that  (1  s) < s <
0:5, as required by Assumption 1. We organize our discussion grouping the
di¤erent examples according to the e¤ectiveness of the specic distortions on
indeterminacy.
4.2.1 Distortions that a¤ect the real interest rate but not the
generalized o¤er curve
In these examples, as distortions do not a¤ect the o¤er curve, by Corollary
1(ii), under Assumption 1 indeterminacy always requires Assumption 5.1.
In the case of productive externalities, indeterminacy cannot occur
if externalities are negative (";L < 0, ";K < 0). Indeed, in this case
KK = ";K < 0 and by Corollary 2(i) Assumption 5.2 is also required for in-
determinacy. However, this Assumption (";L+ ";K > 0) cannot be satised
when ";L < 0, ";K < 0. With positive externalities25, as in Cazzavillan et al.
(1998), Conguration (i) of Table 1 applies (see Table 2) and indeterminacy
can emerge for  > H1 = (s  (1  s))=(";L + ";K   (1 + ) ";K). Hence,
indeterminacy can only emerge in the Cobb-Douglas case with ";L + ";K >
[s  (1  s)] + (1 + ) ";K > [s  (1  s)] = 0:3274125, under our calibra-
tion. This is a high value, hardly reconcilable with empirical studies. See, for
instance, Basu and Fernald (1997) that found degrees of increasing returns
between 0.03 and 0.18 for the U.S. economy, or Harrison (2003) who nds no
signicant externalities for the U.S. manufacturing industry at the 2 digits
level.
Withmarkup variability we may apply the equivalence result of Propo-
sition 6. Therefore,    (N)N(Y ) should be high enough to get indeter-
minacy with a value of  close to 1. In the case of Cournot competition, where
(N) = 1    and N(Y ) = 1=2; we should have  > 1 + 2 s (1 s)(1 s) s = 1:95
under our quarterly calibration (or  > 1:853 with an annual calibration),
which exceeds empirical estimates. See, for instance, Morrison (1993) where
the estimated average annual markups of U.S. manufacturing industries are
between 1.179 and 1.803.
With capital taxation, easy computations show that Assumption 5.1
implies that KK < 0, i.e. K > 0, so that tax rates vary positively with
25The reader may check that with positive externalities (";L > 0 and KK = ";K > 0),
we have  L > 
H
 L, so that (24) is satised and Assumption 8 is veried.
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capital income. However, applying Corollary 2(i), we conclude that indeter-
minacy cannot occur in this case since Assumption 5.2 is not satised when
KK < 0.
We conclude that distortions on capital or output market per se (see also
the case of consumption externalities discussed below) do not seem to be
empirically plausible sources of equilibrium indeterminacy.
4.2.2 Distortions that only a¤ect e¤ective consumption
In these examples distortions do neither a¤ect the o¤er curve nor the real in-
terest rate. Therefore, by Corollaries 1 and 2, indeterminacy always requires
Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2.
With labor income taxation, both assumptions are only satised if
L < 0; implying that indeterminacy does not occur when tax rates are
constant or vary positively with the tax base. For L < 0, as we ob-
tain conguration (i) (see Table 2), indeterminacy occurs for  > H1 =
 LszL+(1 zL)[s (1 s)]
( LzL) , provided that the elasticity of labor supply is high
enough (see Table 1).26 For instance, when L =  127 and zL < 0:5 so that
Assumption 1 (See Table 2) is veried, indeterminacy can emerge with   1
for zL > [s   (1   s)]=[1   (1   s)]  zl = 0:33 under our calibration.
This range of values for zL is in accordance with estimated average labor
income tax rates for several European countries, as obtained in Mendoza et
al. (1994) and in Volkerink et al (2002).
Using the equivalence result of Proposition 7 between labor income taxa-
tion and consumption externalities, we see that in this last case Assump-
tion 1 implies  < 1 and indeterminacy only occurs for  > 0. Hence, indeter-
minacy is only possible when consumption externalities are of the "keeping-
up with the Joneses" type, occurring for  > H1 = [s(1+) (1 s)]=. Un-
der our calibration, indeterminacy with a Cobb-Douglas technology emerges
for 1 >  > [s  (1  s)]=(1  s) = 0:5037, which seems to be an excessive
value. Indeed, although empirical values for these type of externalities do
not seem to exist, Maurer and Meier (2008) found signicant peer e¤ects
within several di¤erent groups of individuals, but in any case lower than
0.44. However, even if consumption externalities in our setup do not lead to
indeterminacy under empirically relevant situations, we should notice that
the indeterminacy mechanism involved is important since it is equivalent to
26Note that in this example, as in all the following ones, H L = 

 L: Therefore H2
does not exist (see Appendix 6.4, with KK = 0) so that footnote 16 applies.
27This corresponds to the case of a constant real government spending considered in
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) for a Ramsey model, and in Pintus (2003) and Gokan
(2005) for a Woodford model.
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labor income taxation, a distortion that may lead to indeterminacy under
relevant parameterizations, as shown above.
We will use this equivalence result to show that taxes may be used as sta-
bilizers, i.e., we show below that labor income tax rates, that vary positively
with the tax base, are able to eliminate indeterminacy due to the presence
of positive consumption externalities, insulating therefore the economy from
belief driven uctuations. To see this consider a model where we have si-
multaneously consumption externalities with  > 0 and labor taxation. In
this case we obtain j;i = j;i = 0 for i = K;L and j = K; ; L;L =
 L zL1 zL + (1  L
zL
1 zL ); L;K = 0 and L;L =  L;Ls =  L;K . It is easy
to see that by choosing the appropriate tax parameters, i.e. by choosing 
and zL such that L
zL
1 zL =

1+
; the government is able to set at zero all
the distortion parameters, i.e., it is able to recover the perfect competition
framework where indeterminacy, and therefore cycles driven by self-fullling
volatile expectations, do not emerge. For example for  = 0:52, as referred
above, indeterminacy would emerge in the Cobb-Douglas case when there
is no taxation. However, choosing combinations of L and zL such that
L
zL
1 zL = 0:342; (i.e. for example L = 1 and zL = 0:255; L = 1:145 and
zL = 0:23 or L = 0:453 and zL = 0:43; all of them empirically plausible)
the economy behaves as an economy without distortions and indeterminacy
does not emerge.
4.2.3 Distortions that a¤ect the generalized o¤er curve but not
the real interest rate
Since in these examples distortions do not a¤ect the real interest rate, by
Corollary 2 (iii), indeterminacy always requires Assumption 5.2.28
With leisure externalities, where only the parameter  L is a¤ected,
Assumption 5.2 implies that  =  L < 0, which also ensures Assumption
5.1. Note also that, since  >  1 under Assumption 4 and "  1, we have
0 < " L = " +  < 1; i.e. the generalized o¤er curve is still positively
sloped (See (6)). In this example H1 =
s (1 s)(1+)
  so that  > H1 ,
 < 1   [s   (1   s)]=[1   (1   s)], where b L < 1 < 0, covering
some parameterizations of congurations (i) and (ii). See Table 2. Hence,
from Proposition 5, and assuming for simplicity that " = 1; indeterminacy
may emerge with  = 1 when  < 1: Under our calibration, we obtain
1 '  0:33, a value that does not seem to be exaggerated. Even though we
28Note that in these examples H L = 

 L, so that H2 = +1. See Appendix 6.4,
with KK = 0. In this case, H2 > F and Assumption 9 is veried. Also, since H2 2
(s LL)
(1+LL)
;+1

does not exist, footnote 16 of Proposition 5 applies.
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do not have empirical estimates for the degree of leisure externalities, note
that this value is signicantly closer to zero than the values used in related
literature, as for instance the value  =  1:23 considered in Benhabib and
Farmer (2000).
Using the equivalence result of Proposition 8 between leisure externalities
and unemployment insurance with e¢ ciency wages, we see that in this
last case indeterminacy occurs with  = 1 if  z
z+(1 z)n <  0:33. We can see
that for empirically plausible values of n and z indeterminacy occurs. For
instance, if the employment rate is n = 0:95, indeterminacy occurs as soon
as the replacement ratio z is higher than 0:32, covering the case of most
developed economies.
In the example with unemployment benets and unions, based on
Dufourt et al. (2008), Assumption 5.2 required for indeterminacy is always
satised, and so it is Assumption 5.1. One can check that H1 = s < 1 and
that F = 1   2(1 s)(1 =2)(1 s)2(1 2s)+2s < 1. Since  = 1, indeterminacy prevails
when  = 1, independently of the degree of union power. This result shows
that the existence of nanced constrained workers together with unemploy-
ment benets, a situation characterizing many developed economies, is likely
to create indeterminacy and also complex employment uctuations through
the occurrence of Hopf and ip bifurcations.
We conclude that with plausible labor market imperfections, either leisure
externalities, unemployment benets or labor income taxation, indetermi-
nacy emerges under reasonable degrees of capital-labor substitution.
5 Concluding Remarks
With our general analysis of the role of market distortions on local dynamics
and the di¤erent examples of specic distortions presented above, we were
able to emphasize several interesting results, some of them already latent in
previous works, but which are here conrmed, generalized and highlighted.
First, our work enabled us to nd classes of specic distortions within which
equivalence results are obtained. Specic distortions belonging to the same
class are observational equivalent and have the same consequences in terms
of the local dynamic behavior of (cyclical) aggregate capital and labor. Sec-
ond, capital market distortions per se do not seem to play a major role for
the occurrence of indeterminacy. On the contrary, bifurcations and inde-
terminacy emerge under labor market rigidities, without imposing strange
or implausible restrictions, whereas for output market distortions, indeter-
minacy requires conditions that might be considered less relevant from an
empirical point of view. These ndings suggest that the functioning of la-
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bor markets, which in the real world show signicant deviations from the
competitive paradigm, may be responsible for the persistency along business
uctuations and for the existence of expectation driven cycles.29 Further
analysis on this issue is therefore important for future research.
A possible explanation for these results may be linked to the fact that
future expectations, which open the room for uctuations driven by self-
fullling expectations, only a¤ect the current decisions of consumers/wor-
kers, rendering distortions that a¤ect the intertemporal trade-o¤ of con-
sumers/workers more important than those a¤ecting the capital accumula-
tion equation.30 Strategic considerations by rms owning productive capital,
which are usually disregarded, may render future expectations of capital-
ists/producers relevant, and change the results. Although some works have
already considered some of these aspects,31 further research on this issue is
welcome.
6 Appendix
6.1 Existence of a steady state
Proposition 9 (Existence of the normalized steady state) (K; L) =
(1; 1) is a stationary solution of the dynamic system (4)-(5) if and only if
A = =(%(1; 1) > 0 and B = [%(1; 1) (1; 1)] 1 
(1; 1) > 0.
Proof. A stationary equilibrium of the dynamic system (4)-(5) is a so-
lution (K;L) = (Kt 1; Lt) for all t, that satises A%(K;L) = = and
(A=B)
(K;L)L =  (K;L). The existence of a steady state can be estab-
lished by choosing appropriately the two scaling parameters A > 0 and B > 0
so as to ensure that one steady state coincides with (K;L) = (1; 1). From
the rst equation, we obtain a unique solution A = =(%(1; 1) > 0. Substi-
tuting this into the second equation we then obtain the unique solution for
B = [%(1; 1) (1; 1)] 1 
(1; 1) > 0.
29Dufourt et al. (2007) replicate the uctuations and persistence of unemployment
data, considering i.i.d. sunspot shocks on expectations in a model with unions and un-
employment benets. Chari et al. (2007) show quantitatively that labor market frictions
constitute one of the most promising mechanisms through which shocks on fundamentals
lead to business uctuations.
30Indeed, in all the usual macrodynamic frameworks, including the Ramsey and over-
lapping generations models, rms just rent productive capital, accummulated from past
savings of consumers/capitalists, so that future expectations do not directly inuence cap-
ital accumulation.
31See for instance dAspremont et. al (2000).
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6.2 Local Dynamics - Proof of Proposition 5
Our proof of Proposition 5 is based on the geometrical method developed in
Grandmont et al. (1998). We consider that s and  are xed throughout
the analysis and, for given di¤erent values of ij and ij satisfying all the
Assumptions considered, we study how (T;D) change as " and  vary in
their admissible ranges.
The half-line  We start by discussing how T and D move in the space
(T;D) as " is made to continuously change. From (8) and (9), the locus
of points (T;D) = (T ("); D(")) as " varies in [1;+1) describes a half-
line  in the plane (T;D), starting for " = 1 at (T (1); D(1)) = (T1; D1)
and pointing upwards as " increases to +1 (since D increases with ", see
Lemma 1), with a slope S equal to:
S = 1 + K;K   
1  s  K;K

(10)
Note that the half-line  shifts when  changes, because its slope S and
its initial point (T1; D1) depend on .
The next Lemma, that can be easily proved using (10), Assumption 1
and simple analytical computations, will help us understanding why results
are di¤erent according to whether KK  0 or KK > 0.
Lemma 2 Under Assumption 1 and dening T as in (20), we have the
following:
1. If KK < 0 then 0 < S < 1 for all  2

s LL
1+LL
;+1

and lim
!+1
S < 1
2. If KK = 0 then 0 < S < 1 for all  2

s LL
1+LL
;+1

and lim
!+1
S = 1
3. If KK > 0, then:
(a) 1 < S < 1 + K;K if and only if  2 (T ;+1), and lim
!+1
S > 1
(b) S = 1 if and only if  = T
(c) 0 < S < 1 if and only if  2

s LL
1+LL
; T

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The half-line 1 Let us now discuss the behavior of (T1; D1) as  varies.
From (8) and (9), the locus of points (T1(); D1()) obtained as  decreases
from+1 to (s LL)=(1+LL) describes a half-line1, starting for  = +1
at (T1(+1); D1(+1)) = (1+ (1+KK)(1+ L)  KKL1+LL ;
(1+KK)(1+ L)  KKL
1+LL
),
and pointing upwards as  decreases (since D1 is decreasing in , see Lemma
1). The slope of the half-line 1, S1  dD1=ddT1=d , is given by:
S1 =
( L    L)

(s  L;L) (1 + KK)  (1 + L;L)(1  s  K;K)

(a L    L) (s  LL) (1 + KK)
(11)
with  L and 
a
 L dened respectively in Assumption 4 and in (12) of Ap-
pendix 6.3.1.
The next Lemma will help us understanding why results may be di¤erent
in the three di¤erent congurations considered for  L.
Lemma 3 Under Assumptions 1-6, dening b L and 
c
 L as in Appendix
6.3.1, and SB 2 ( 1; 0) as in (17) in Appendix 6.3.2, the following holds:
(i) For  L > b L, jS1j > 1;
(ii) For  L 2
 
c L; 
b
 L

, S1 2 ( 1; SB), where SB is the slope of 1
when 1 goes through point B;
(iii) For  L < c L; S1 2 (SB; 0):
P roof : First note that, given the denitions of the critical values of  L
in Appendix 6.3.1, S1 can be written as in (11) but also in several di¤erent
ways (see (14)-(16)). Under Assumption 4,  L >  L and the numera-
tor of S1 in (11) is negative, given Assumption 1. Hence, under Assump-
tion 1, S1 < 0 i¤  L < a L and S1 > 0 i¤  L > 
a
 L. Using (14) we
can see that, given Assumption 5.2, S1 =2 (0; 1) and we obtain S1 > 1 for
 L  a L. Also, using (15), we see that, under Assumption 1, S1 <  1
for a L >  L > 
b
 L. This proves Lemma 3.(i). Note also that, using (11)
and Assumption 1, S1 is decreasing in  L for a L >  L > 

 L. Hence,
by decreasing  L further from b L until 

 L, S1 must increase from  1
until 0 (see (15) and (11)), and S1 cannot cross the value SB 2 ( 1; 0)
twice for  L < b L. This, by (16), implies that only one of the roots
c L; 
c+
 L can lay in the interval
 
 L; 
b
 L

. We now show that this root
must be c L. Indeed, using (16) and (15), and since SB 2 ( 1; 0) un-
der the Assumptions of Lemma 3 (see (17)), we have that the inequality 
b L    L
 
2(s  L;L) (1 + KK)  (1 + L;L)(1  s  K;K)

>
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( L c L)( L c+ L)(1+L;L)(1 s K;K)(1+K;K)
[2(1+L;L)+(1+KK)( L L L)]
is satised for any value of  L <
a L, and in particular for  L = 
b
 L: (Note that 
b
 L < 
a
 L, since S1 =
 1 < 0 for  L = b L and S1 < 0 i¤  L < a L). Therefore, using the
last expression with  L = b L, together with Assumptions 1 and 6, we
have
 
b L   c L
  
b L   c+ L

< 0, and the following is satised: c L <
b L < 
c+
 L. Hence, S1 crosses SB for  L = 
c
 L and  1 < S1 < SB for
b L >  L > 
c
 L, while 0 > S1 > SB for  L < 
c
 L. This proves Lemma
3.(ii) and (iii).
We now characterize the local stability properties of the steady state
for each conguration dened in Lemma 3. We use geometrical arguments
whenever possible, by referring to Figures 1-3. For any given conguration,
remember that the half-line , which starts for " = 1 on half-line 1, points
upwards to the right as " increases from 1 to +1. Also, as  decreases from
+1 to (s  LL) = (1 + LL), the half line  becomes less steep (see (10))
and its initial point (T1; D1) moves upwards along the half line 1 (D1 is
decreasing in , Lemma 1). Recall also that the half-line 1 always start for
 = +1 on line (AC) between points A and C, due to Assumptions 3, 5.1
and 6. Finally remember that the half-line 1 points upwards as  decreases
from +1 to (s  LL) = (1 + LL). The critical values of  L,  and " used
below are given in Section 6.3.
Conguration (i) ( L > b L) Using Lemma 3, we have jS1j > 1.
Therefore, the half-line 1 that starts on the line (AC), between A and C,
points upwards with a slope S1 strictly greater than 1 or strictly smaller
than  1, crossing neither (AB), nor (AC) (see Figure 1). However, since
1 crosses the segment [BC], there is a critical value for ; H1 >
s LL
1+LL
such that D1(H1) = 1 (see (18)). If   H1, the half-line  starts on 1
above [BC] and since it points upwards to the right, it crosses the line (AC),
above point C, for " = "T . Accordingly, the steady state is a source for
1  " < "T , undergoes a transcritical bifurcation for " = "T and becomes
a saddle for " > "T . If  > H1, (T1(); D1()) is inside the triangle (ABC)
and the half-line  must also cross the line (BC), but Hopf bifurcations only
occur if the crossing point is on the left of point C, so that the half-line 
crosses [BC] in its interior. We can see geometrically that, by continuity,
for  higher but close to H1 the half-line  crosses the segment [BC] in its
interior. However, for higher values of  > H1 this may not happen. Let
us dene H2 2 (H1 ;+1) as a critical value for  such that the half line 
goes through point C.
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Consider rst that KK < 0, which means that S < 1 and that lim
!+1
S <
1 (see Lemma 2). In Appendix 6.4 we show that H2 is unique and for
 > H2 the half-line  crosses rst (AC) below point C, crossing (BC) on
the right of point C so that no Hopf bifurcations occur, while the reverse
occurs for H1 <  < H2 .
When KK = 0, we still have S < 1, although lim
!+1
S = 1. Due to this,
H2 may not exist. As shown in Appendix 6.4, this happens if 
H
 L   L,
implying that the half-line crosses the segment [BC] in its interior and then
crosses (AC) above point C, for all  2 (H1 ;+1). Otherwise, if H L >  L
then H2 exists and everything is similar to the case of KK < 0.
Assuming now that KK > 0, there exists the critical value T > (s  
LL)=(1+LL) for  such that S (T ) = 1 and S > 1 for  > T (see Lemma
2). To simplify the exposition we assume that:
Assumption 7 If KK > 0, then T > maxfH1 ; Fg.
where F is introduced for further reference and is such that the half-line 1
crosses line (AB), i.e., 1 +D1(F ) + T1(F ) = 0 (see (19).
This Assumption implies that for   T the half-line  starts within the
triangle (ABC) and points upwards with a slope higher than 1. Hence,
when   T , the half-line  only crosses [BC] on the left of point C. For
T >  > H1we further assume that:
Assumption 8 If KK > 0 and T >  > maxfH1 ; Fg, then "H < "T .
This Assumption means that H2 2 (H1 ;+1) does not exist and is ensured
if (24) of Appendix 6.4 is satised. It implies that, when H1 <  < T , the
half-line  crosses rst the segment [BC] and then line (AC) above C.
Conguration (ii) ( L 2
 
c L; 
b
 L

) Using Lemma 3, we have that
S1 2 ( 1; SB). Therefore, in this conguration, the half-line 1 points up-
wards to the left, crossing line (AB) above point B for  = F (see Figure
2).
Consider rst that KK  0 so that S < 1 (see Lemma 2). When  < F ,
(T1(); D1()) is below line (AB) and above B. Since the half-line  points
upwards it does not cross [BC], but crosses (AB) before crossing (AC). When
F    H1, (T1(); D1()) is above (or over) (AB) and [BC]. Then,
the half-line  only crosses line (AC). As in the previous conguration,
when  > H1 the point (T1(); D1()) is inside the triangle (ABC) and,
for KK < 0, there is a unique value H2 such that for H1 <  < H2, the
half-line  crosses rst [BC] and then line (AC) above C, and for  > H2,
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the half-line  only crosses line (AC) below C (see Appendix 6.4). Also,
when KK = 0, if H2 does not exist, for  > H1 the half-line  crosses rst
[BC] and then line (AC) above C. If H2 exists then everything is similar to
the case where KK < 0.
Consider now that KK > 0. In this case, the critical value T > 0
exists and, as in the previous conguration, we consider Assumption 7 so
that T > H1 > F : Therefore, for  < H1, S is still smaller than 1 and
we obtain the same results as before. When H1 <  < T , (T1(); D1()) is
inside the triangle (ABC) and, under Assumption 8, the half-line  crosses
rst [BC], and then (AC) above point C. When   T , S becomes greater
than 1, which means that  only crosses [BC].
Conguration (iii) ( L < c L) Using Lemma 3, we have that S1 2
(SB; 0), with SB 2 ( 1; 0). Therefore, the slope S1 is negative and greater
than  1, and the half line 1, that points upwards to the left, crosses line
(AB) below point B (see Figure 3). In this conguration, a new critical
value, H3, the value of  such that the half line  goes through point B;
becomes relevant. In Appendix 6.5 we prove that in this conguration, there
exists a unique critical value H3 2 (H1 ; F ) such that the half-line  goes
through point B and crosses [BC] on the right of B for  > H3.
We begin by assuming K;K  0, so that S < 1. Recall now that when
H2 >
s LL
1+LL
exists (its existence is always ensured when K;K < 0, see
Appendix 6.4) the half-line  crosses (BC) on the left of C for  < H2 and
on the right of C for  > H2. We can now see, geometrically, that although
in Conguration (ii) H2 > F , in the current conguration if H2 exists it
may be higher or lower than F . To simplify the exposition we consider the
following Assumption:
Assumption 9 If  L < c L, K;K  0 and H2 > s LL1+LL , then H2 > F .
Hence, for  < H3,  starts on the left-side of line (AB), crosses line
(AB) above B and then crosses line (AC). For H3 <  < F ,  also starts
on the left-side of (AB), but crosses (AB) below B, the segment [BC], and
(AC) above C. Then, for F   < H2, (T1(); D1()) is inside (ABC),
and  crosses [BC] and (AC) above C. For  > H2, (T1(); D1()) is still
inside (ABC) and  crosses (AC) below C. This last case does not appear
if H2 does not exist. See Appendix 6.4, for K;K = 0.
We consider now the case where K;K > 0. Under Assumptions 7 and 8,
T > F (> H3). Then, for  < H3, the half-line  crosses rst line (AB)
above B and then it crosses line (AC). For H3 <  < F ,  crosses (AB)
below B, the segment [BC] and, under Assumption 8, it crosses line (AC)
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above C. For F   < T ,  starts inside (ABC) with a slope smaller than
1. Then, it crosses [BC] and, given again 8, it crosses line (AC) above C.
For   T , the slope S being greater than 1,  only crosses [BC].
All these results are summarized in Table 1.
6.3 Critical values of the parameters
6.3.1 Denitions and expressions for critical values of  L
 L is such that S1 = 1 and is given in Assumption 5.2.
H L is such that D1 (+1) = 1 and is given in Assumption 5.1.
L L is such that D1 (+1) =  1 and is given in Assumption 6.
 L is such that S1 (

 L) = 0 and is given in Assumption 4.
a L is such that S1 (
a
 L) =1 and is given by:
a L  f(1 + L;L)[(1 + L;L)(1  s  K;K) + L;K(1  s+ K;L)
+KL
(1  s  K;K) (s  LL)
(1  s+ KL)
]  (s  LL) (1  K;KL;L    ;KK;L)
 (1 + L;L) ;Lg= (s  LL) (1 + KK) (12)
b L is such that S1
 
b L

=  1 and, using (12), is given by:
b L =
a L (s  LL) (1 + KK) +

(s  LL) (1 + KK)  (1 + L;L)(1  s  K;K)

 L
2(s  L;L) (1 + KK)  (1 + L;L)(1  s  K;K)
(13)
c L is the lower root of equation S1 = SB (see (16)), where SB is given in
(17). The other root is noted c+ L.
6.3.2 Expressions for S1 in terms of critical values of  L
S1; given in (11), can also be written as:
S1 = 1 +
( L    L)  (1 + LL) (1  s  KK)
(a L    L) (s  LL) (1 + KK)
; (14)
S1 =  1 +
 
b L    L
 
2(s  L;L) (1 + KK)  (1 + L;L)(1  s  K;K)

(a L    L) (s  LL) (1 + KK)
;(15)
S1 = SB +
( L   c L)
 
 L   c+ L

(1 + L;L)(1  s  K;K)
(a L    L) (s  LL)

2(1 + L;L) + (1 + K;K)( ;L   L ;L)
 ,(16)
where SB is the slope of 1 when 1 goes through point B = ( 2; 1),
satisfying SB 2 ( 1; 0) under Assumptions 1, 5.1 and 6, and being given by:
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SB 
  (1 + KK)
 
H L    L

2(1 + LL) + (1 + KK) ( L   L L)
2 ( 1; 0) : (17)
6.3.3 Denitions and expressions for critical values of 
H1 is the critical value of  such that D1(H1) = 1 and is given by:
H1 
s  L;L
1 + L;L
+

(s  L;L) (1 + KK)  (1 + L;L)(1  s  K;K)

( ;L    ;L)
(1 + L;L)(1 + KK)(H ;L    ;L)
.
(18)
H2 is a critical value of  such that the half-line  goes through the
point (T;D) = (2; 1), i.e., goes through point C.32 Note that "T = "H for
 = H2.
H3 is the critical value of  such that the half line  goes through the
point (T;D) = ( 2; 1), i.e., goes through point B.33 Note that "F = "H for
 = H3.
The critical value F is dened by 1 +D1(F ) + T1(F ) = 0,
F 
s  L;L
1 + L;L
+

2(s  L;L) (1 + KK)  (1 + L;L)(1  s  K;K)

(b ;L    ;L)
2(1 + L;L)(1 + KK)( ;L   L ;L)
.
(19)
T is the value of  for which S = 1,
T  (1  s  KK)
KK
. (20)
6.3.4 Expressions for critical values of "
"H is such that D = 1, which is equivalent to:
"H = 1 +
(1 + K;K)(   H1)(H ;L    ;L)
(1 + K;K)  (1  s  K;K)
. (21)
"F is such that 1 + T +D = 0. After some computations, we obtain:
"F = 1 +
2(1 + K;K)(F   )( ;L   L ;L)
(2 + K;K)  (1  s  K;K)
. (22)
"T is such that 1  T +D = 0. After some computations, we obtain:
"T = 1 +
(1  s  K;K)( ;L    ;L)
(1  s  K;K   K;K)
. (23)
32In Appendix 6.4, we show conditions for its existence and uniqueness.
33In Appendix 6.5 we we show conditions for its existence and uniqueness.
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6.4 Existence of H2
First recall that H2 is a value of  such that the half-line line goes through
point C, i.e., such that H = T (see (21) and (23)). Further notice that
if H2 exists it must be such that H2 2 (H1 ;+1). Indeed, we can see
geometrically that for  < H1 the half line  starts above the line (BC)
and, since it points upwards to the right, if it crosses line (AC) it does so
above point C.
Consider rst the case where K;K < 0. In this case, S 2 (0; 1) for
 2

s LL
1+LL
;+1

and lim
!+1
S 2 (0; 1) (see Lemma 2). Hence, for  slightly
higher that H1 the half line  crosses rst (BC) and then it crosses (AC)
above point C, i.e., H < T . Since lim!+1
S 2 (0; 1), we can see geometrically
that a solution H2 2 (H1 ;+1)must exist and the number of these solutions
is odd. Since the equation H = T is a polynomial of degree 2, i.e. has at
most two solutions, we deduce the uniqueness of H2 , such that H < T
for H1 <  < H2 , and H > T for  > H2.
Consider now that K;K = 0. In this case, we still have S 2 (0; 1)
for  2

s LL
1+LL
;+1

, although lim
!+1
S = 1 (see Lemma 2). Therefore, it is
possible that the half line , for (H1 ;+1), always cross the line (AC) above
point C; and in this case H2 does not exist. Indeed, when K;K = 0, T
does not depend on  (see (23)) and the equation H = T is linear, having
a solution H2 =
s LL
1+LL
+
[(s LL) (1+LL)(1 s KK)]( L  L)
(1+LL)(H L  L)
. Hence, under
Assumptions 1, 4 and 5.2, if H L   L there is no H2 2

s LL
1+LL
;+1

, i.e.,
the half line  cannot cross point C and always go through (AC) above point
C. Therefore, we obtain H < T for all  2

s LL
1+LL
;+1

. Otherwise, if
H L > 

 L, there is a unique value H2 2 (H1 ;+1) and we have H < T
for  < H2, and H > T for  > H2 :
Finally, consider that K;K > 0. Since under Assumption 7 T > H1,
we have S 2 (0; 1) for  2 [H1 ; T ), and S > 1 for  > T , with lim
!+1
S > 1
(see Lemma 2). We can see that for  slightly higher than H1 the half line
 crosses (BC) on the left of C and (AC) above point C, i.e., H < T .
If there is a solution H2 to H = T it has to satisfy H2 2 (H1 ; T ).
Since S > 1 for  > T , the half line  crosses (BC) on the left of C,
the existence of H2 2 (H1 ; T ) is not ensured and the number of solutions
H2 2 (H1 ; T ) that satisfy H = T must be even. The equation H = T
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is equivalent to g() = 0, where:
g()  K;K(1 + KK)(H ;L  ;L)(   T )(   H1)
+ [(1 + K;K)  (1  s  K;K)](1  s  KK) ( L    L)
Under Assumptions 1 and 5, this function describes a convex parabola with
g(H1) > 0, g(T ) > 0 and g(+1) = +1. Hence, either g() = 0 has two
solutions (requiring g0(H1) < 0) or none (as it happens for instance when
g0(H1  0) ). As g0(H1)  0 is equivalent to:
T (
H
 ;L    ;L)  H1(H ;L    ;L) (24)
when this inequality is satised, there is no solution to g() = 0.34 This
implies that for all  > H1 the half-line  always goes above point C and
that, in particular, Assumption 8 is satised.
6.5 Existence of H3
Using (21) and (22), we have that H  F , h()  0, where:
h()  [(2 + K;K)  (1  s  K;K)](H ;L    ;L)(   H1)
+ 2[(1 + K;K)  (1  s  K;K)]( ;L   L ;L)(   F )
(25)
By denition, H3 is a value of  such that H = F ; therefore it must be
a solution of h() = 0. Since h() is a polynomial of degree 2, the equation
h() = 0 has at most two solutions. We limit our analysis to conguration
(iii) since H3 is only relevant under this conguration. Since  is positively
sloped pointing upwards, it can only go through point B if its initial point
in 1 is on the left of line (AB), i.e., H3 < F . Also, the polynomial h()
is a convex function of  since the coe¢ cient of the quadratic term 2 is
positive.35 We can see geometrically that if there is a H3 >
s LL
1+LL
then it
must satisfy s LL
1+LL
< H1 < H3 < F . Using (25), and Assumptions 5, 6,
we see that in this conguration h(F ) > 0 and h (H1) < 0. Therefore there
is a unique H3 2 (H1 ; F ) such that h (H3) = 0. By continuity, we have
that H > F for F >  > H3, and H < F for H1 <  < H3.
34Note that, under Assumption 5.1, this inequality is always satised when  ;L > 
H
 ;L:
35Indeed, this coe¢ cient is given by c  (2 + KK) (H L  L)+2 (1 + KK) ( L 
L L) which is positive under Assumptions 1, 5 and 6.
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Figure 1: Conguration (i), with K;K > 0
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Figure 2: Conguration (ii), with K;K > 0
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Figure 3: Conguration (iii), with K;K > 0
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